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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO·MPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MRS. HELEN SHEEHAN ARTHUR,
and
MRS. GLENERA SHEEHAN HUNTER,
vs.
NICK CHOURNOS and wife,
vs.
MILTON A. OMAN et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
9123

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
stATEMENt OF FACTS
The above entitled three cases were consolidated for
trial before the District Court of Box Elder County, Utah.
Each is a proceeding in eminent domain wherein Southern
Pacific, plaintiff and appellant, filed suit to condemn a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right of way over and upon certain grazing lands owned
in fee by the different respondents and upon two mining
uclaims" in which defendants Oman and Chournos and
some of their family claim an interest. All of the real
property involved is situated on Promontory Point, Box
Elder County, Utah. The said right of way was needed
to obtain gravel and other earth material as fill for appellant's new railroad bed running west across Great Salt
Lake from Promontory Point. The trial court, over respondent's objections, granted appellant an order of
immediate occupancy in each case and found the necessity existed for the requested right of way. With the approval of respective counsel, the court then proceeded
with the trial of the question of damages in the consolidated cases.
While the pleadings of respondents as well as their
opening arguments endeavor to include numerous socalled elements of damage resulting from appellant's condemnation, the actual trial of the cases here on appeal
resolved itself into an attempt of respondents to establish
two damage items: ( 1) Market value of the gravel taken
in each case, and ( 2) Loss or damage from interference
with sheep operations, or, a useverance" damage as the trial
court described it. ( T r. 151-15 3 ) The evidence presented was directed to those items. It is that evidence and
the court's rulings thereon which form the subject of this
appeal.
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows: Defendants' Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence, is a colored
map showing the general location of the gravel pits exca-
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vated by appellant, and the ownership of the various tracts
occupied by appellant under the order of occupancy.
Southern Pacific Company, the appellant, used the gravel
and other material taken from those pits, along with material from ad joining lands of others, to construct the
new railroad fill across the Lake from Promontory Point.
The parties in each of the cases stipulated at the trial upon
the amounts of material taken from the respondents'
respective lands, and the judgments for the gravel material are based upon those amounts. The type of material
taken was substantially the same in each case, and consisted of gravel and other earth material as found upon
the ground. Appellant used the material without any
processing or other treatment, and placed it directly along
the proposed new railroad line in the Lake. Approximately
44 million cubic yards of said material of all types were
deposited in the construction work, but the quantity used
from respondents' properties amounted to approximately
one million nine hundred thousand cubic yards in the
Hunter-Arthur case ( #8071), about two million one
hundred thousand cubic yards in the Nick Chournos case
( #8191), and a little more than a million in the remaining case. (Tr. 303, 361-362) The evidence disclosed no
special use to which the said gravel could be applied without some treatment, and respondents did not produce
evidence that any such material had been sold or used for
any purpose from their Promontory lands prior to appellant's construction of the fill. In fact, the evidence revealed that there would be no actual demand for the
material at any time in the foreseeable future. (Tr. 32,
38, 51, 60 and 94)
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Respondents' only use of their Promontory property
up to the time of trial had been as grazing land for sheep
operations carried on by respondent Chournos and by
lessees of the Hunter-Arthur lands. (Tr. 170). Mrs.
Hunter and Mrs. Arthur do not own livestock and have
carried on no such operations upon the lands involved in
case #8071. (Tr. 169-170)
The evidence is that the two gravel pits dug by
appellant upon the Chournos lands cover 7.38 acres of a
40 acre tract temporarily taken and occupied by appellant
in one pit area under the order of immediate occupancy,
and 29.79 acres of a 160 acre tract to the south temporarily occupied in the other pit area. This latter tract has
no relation to the ((severance" damage issue. The two
Hunter-Arthur gravel pits excavated by appellant cover
18.44 acres of a 100 acre tract taken, and 17.92 acres in
the other tract ( 140 acres) occupied under the court
order. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4)
The whole borrow pit area #2, which includes among
other lands the aforesaid small portions belonging to respondents, covers approximately 344 acres. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 4). That is the borrow pit supposedly causing the
((severance" damage. We therefore see that the Chournos'
land in that area excavated is only 1/49th of the whole
pit, and Hunter-Arthur's excavation in that pit area
covers only about 119th of the said pit.
The court made the order of occupancy on October
25, 1957, in the Hunter-Arthur case and on June 24, 1958,
in the Chournos and the Chournos-Oman suits. Appellant, on or before June 30, 19 59, surrendered possession
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to respondents of all the lands held under the orders of
occupancy, and as of that date relinquished any rights
it had therein by reason of the lawsuits here on appeal.
The testimony of respondents' own witnesses disclosed
that the gravel pits made by plaintiff upon respondents'
lands do not prevent the passage or running of livestock
around or near them from one part of respondents' lands
to another (Tr. 230). The map (Defendants' Exhibit 1)
and the testimony established that no legal useverance"
occurred to respondents' lands by plaintiff's taking.
The court submitted to the jury a form of special
verdict, containing a question in each case as to the value
of the :fill material removed by plaintiff; and questions
in case #8071 and case #8191 as to the useverance" damage resulting to respondents from plaintiff's condemnation
of their lands. The jury returned an unconscionable verdict upon each item submitted. The court entered judgment immediately upon the verdict for the :fill material,
but held up judgment on the useverance" items until it
heard arguments upon plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The court at first sustained the motion as to the useverance" item in each of the two cases, but conditional upon
respondents' accepting and plaintiff's paying a reduced
amount of such damage. Plaintiff declined to pay the reduced sum agreed to by defendants, and the court then
completely overruled the motion for a new trial. Plaintiff
here appeals from the court's judgment and its denial of
plaintiff's motion for a new trial in the case and upon
each item of damage; from the court's admission of certain evidence; from its submission to the jury of the
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question of useverance" damage, and from other errors
in law committed by the court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY
OF CERTAIN WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS
TO THE VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL MATERIAL TAKEN BY APPELLANT; AND IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE THE RESPONDENTS'
EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER GRAVEL SALES.
I

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY
THE QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND
BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN
TESTIMONY PERTAINING THERETO.
(a) THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRODUCE COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT OTHER SIMILAR LANDS WERE UNAVAILABLE.
(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM APPELLANT'S O·PERATION UPON LANDS NOT
OWNED BY RESPONDENTS.
(c) THE SO-CALLED USEVERANCE" DAM-
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AGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS'
WITNESSES CONSISTED OF DAMAGES SUPPOSED TO HAVE RESULTED TO A BUSINESS
CARRIED ON BY RESPONDENTS, OR THEIR
LESSEE, NAMELY SHEEP OPERATIONS.
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE ARRIVED AT BY ADDING THE VALUES OF
DIFFERENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN.
(e) RESPONDENTS PRESENTED NO· COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE
OF THEIR REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO
HAVE BEEN DAMAGED.
(f) THE TESTIMONY DO·ES NOT ESTABLISH ANY SEVERANCE OF RESPONDENTS'
LANDS AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE
COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES.
POINT III
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE AND THE RESULT OF PREJUDICE O·F THE JURY.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY
OF CERTAIN WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS
TO THE VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL
MATERIAL TAKEN BY APPELLANT; AND IN
RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANTS'
EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER GRAVEL SALES.
The opinions of the witnesses called by respondents
to establish the value of the :fill material taken for appellant's railroad fill were based on sheer speculation. Not
one witness established any present market value, or even
one arising in the near future. To appreciate the incompetency of the evidence presented by those witnesses, one
must review their testimony in some detail.
The first witness called by respondents, a Mr. Storey,
was not qualified as an expert to render an opinion on
values. He was not connected in any way with the gravel
business, and knew nothing of the local market conditions
for gravel. (Tr. 22-3 5) His testimony was that he had
not made any appraisal of gravel properties for ten years,
and he had no knowledge of similar sales in the area, nor
had he made an effort to learn whether such sales had
occurred. (Tr. 25 and 26) Over appellant's objection,
the court permitted this witness to give his opinion of the
uvalue of the material." An even more serious error is that
Mr. Storey's opinion was admittedly based upon a ufuture
value" of such deposits of material and a demand unot too
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far away." (Tr. 26-27-32 and 38) Furthermore, the
questions by respondents' attorney to Mr. Storey referred
to uvalue" of the material and not market value. (Tr.
2 5-3 1 ) This witness also testified that he did not know
of anyone who would pay even close to the figure he gave
as a value per cubic yard for the gravel taken. (Tr. 37)
The second witness for respondents, Mr. J. P. Gibbons, testified that he is president of Gibbons & Reed, a
construction firm in Utah, and had some experience with
fill material and buying and selling of sand and gravel
within the western states. Mr. Gibbons' opinion of the
type or quality of the material removed by appellant was
arrived at primarily from his brief inspection of some of
the subject Promontory area before the pits were begun
or any material removed. In fact, he gave as one of his
qualifications for opinion testimony a plane trip he made
over the area. (Tr. 43-44) As in the case of witness
Storey's interrogation, nearly all of the questions directed
by respondents' counsel to Mr. Gibbons referred to
uvalue" and not market value.
Furthermore, Mr. Gibbons' testimony is replete with
statements that his opinion is pure speculation and that
he was speaking of a ((future" value. (Tr. 48 and 49).
Answering a direct question, he affirmed that his estimate
was a uspeculative" value at this time. (Tr. 49 and 50).
He testified that he did not know of any one who would
buy the material, and that his firm would not offer anything for the gravel taken, but uwe buy land on a speculative basis in the hope that the future will make it of
some value and it is conceivable that we would consider it
in that light. I have no opinion as to what that would be."
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(Tr. 48) When asked whether he would consider paying
5¢ for the material (his given opinion as to value), he
gave the unconsidered and irrelevent reply that he would
uif he had that contract," referring to the contract appellant railroad had let for constructing the fill project.
(Tr. 47) Mr. Gibbons testified on cross examination that
he considered the gravel materials and deposits of respondents as ua natural resource that has a market or has a value
when a market is established . ... There's a fixed number
of yards of material in existence. Currently we are depleting the materials that are closest to the point of usage
. . . so any gravel that is of a satisfactory nature has a
value on it. And the time and conditions will establish
what that value will be at the time of consumption, but
we would look on it ourselves, it is like dollars that are
in the ground that will some day have a value (italics
ours.)" (Tr. 51 and 52) From these statements by Mr.
Gibbons, it is readily apparent that he was guessing at
some value for the material taken by appellant, and that
he did not consider it to have any present value as that
term is used in a business sense and by the court in eminent
domain cases. His testimony amounts to sheer speculation
about a future value for some indefinite use at some indefinite time. Appellant submits that if such opinion
testimony is allowed to stand in condemnation proceedings, the whole principle of just compensation for the
award of damages is destroyed, and every party, whether
public or private, faced with the necessity of condemning
property, will be at the mercy of such speculation and will
find the cost of acquisition prohibitive. The court's admission into evidence of Mr. Gibbons' opinion of the
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ccvalue" of respondents' fill material was so prejudicial
as to constitute fatal error. (For a .contrast in the lower
court's ruling upon qualification of experts on gravel
valuation see the discussion about Mr. Bagley's testimony.)
(Tr. 296-297)
There is also reversible error in the court's allowing
Mr. Gibbons to testify about the use of other fill materials
in the ((State of Utah," and on various projects in Salt
Lake County. (Tr. 54) The general uses related by the
witness were not connected in any way to a use or even
a possible market for the material on Promontory Point.
Mr. Gibbons never identified his road projects which used
the fill material except to say uthe new interstate system
in the state." (Tr. 54) His testimony was certainly
irrelevant.
Mr. Gibbons' opinion in court of 5¢ per cubic yard
as a value of respondents' material appears to have been
based primarily upon a document respondents introduced
as their Exhibit 2, and identified by Mr. Gibbons as a
survey from his office of different gravel pits from which
his firm had purchased gravel in the years 1953 through
1958. (Tr. 56-59) The court admitted this Exhibit in
evidence over appellant's objection, and that ruling violates a very important principle of damages in condemnation cases. The Exhibit contains references to purchases
by Gibbons & Reed of gravel from California and Nevada,
and various Utah locations not pertinent to the local area
now under consideration. This highly incompetent and
prejudicial piece of evidence is alone sufficient to compel a
reversal of the lower court's decision in all three cases here
on appeal. For example, the second ((NOTE" on the Ex-
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hibit refers to gravel material owned by Gibbons & Reed,
and states that the materials were ucharged to the projects
at ... 5¢ per cubic yard." How can any value or price
set under those circumstances be considered a sale of similar material under similar circumstances in the present
case! (Neither the Exhibit nor the testimony indicates to
what projects that uNOTE" refers.) Such an accounting
procedure or entry whereby the contractor's own material
is charged to the job at so much per yard is not a sale at
all, regardless of the time or the place of the project. Another example of the shocking incompetency of this
Exhibit 2 is its last uNOTE" at the bottom of the page
where appears the information that Geneva Steel Company
uoffered" to sell some three million yards of fill material
uat S¢ per cubic yard." (The time and circumstances of
the offer were never disclosed). That statement in the
Exhibit cannot be considered as any reference to a similar
sale of similar rna terials. An offer to sell, especially by one
not a party, is no proof of a sale or of value. See Volume
1, Orgel on V,aluation Under Eminent Domain, Second
Edition, page 620-622, and the cases therein cited. This
Exhibit 2 accompanied the jurors to the jury room for their
deliberations in the trial court. No further argument is
needed to point out what prejudicial affect such irrelevant
and incompetent information must have had upon the
minds of these jurors.
The next witness called by respondents was Mr. Fife.
He testified that his gravel company had paid all the way
from 2¢ to 1O¢ uon an average,"· for sand and gravel in
place, and that the average price would be about 5¢ per
cubic yard. In stating his opinion of the value of the rna·
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terial taken by appellant, this witness actually testified as
to what he and his :firm had paid for sand and gravel, but
did not state where those purchases were made or what
type of material was bought. His opinion as to the value
of the respondents' material was not a true opinion of
any market value for the material in our cases. On cross
examination, Mr. Fife testified that he still held the opinion
that the respondents' gravel material had no commercial
value at any time, including the dates when the appellant
took the material; that the only party who would buy the
material would be the appellant railroad and that at the
time of taking, uthere would be no market for it." (Tr. 68
and 69) The witness further testified that he had examined the material and the gravel pits of respondents just
prior to the time of the trial and that the gravel would
require processing to be used for con.crete aggregate; that
because of the haulage cost from the pit areas on Promontory Point, the respondents' material could not compete
with the large supply located in the vicinity of Brigham
City some sixty miles away. (Tr. 71 and 72) (The respondents through their witnesses frequently attempted
to prove the Brigham City area to be a market for their
fill material). Mr. Fife expressly stated that at the times
pertinent to the present law suits, no demand existed for
the material and there was uno need for it," other than
by appellant, at any price. (Tr. 74)
Another instance of prejudicial error in the respondents' cases occurred when their counsel asked Mr~ Fife a
hypothetical question based on the assumption that there
was no gravel on Promontory and the material had to be
hauled from Brigham City. Counsel added up the esti-
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mated freight cost of such haulage, and then asked the
witness if such a practice would bring the cost of gravel
delivered at Promontory to $5.65 a yard. The court permitted the question. Obviously, the assumption made in
the question was contrary to the evidence that there was
a large quantity of material at Promontory. More important, it is established law that the cost to the condemnor
of bringing other material to a job site is irrelevant and
highly improper to establish value of material (i.e. property) already there. (See Orgel, suPra, Volume 1, pages
352-353).
For a real trip into the realm of speculation and fantasy, we invite the court's attention to all of the testimony
of Mr. Ford, the next witness for respondents. Over objections of appellant's counsel, this witness was asked and
permitted to answer questions ranging from the future
business growth of the state of Utah to the possible future
use of fill material on roads that might be constructed in
the general area near Brigham City, but whose location
and date of .construction were not known to the witness.
The only source of his knowledge of those proposed roads
came from what he had read in newspapers. (Tr. 95) A
typical statement made by this witness was in response to
Mr. Oman's question asking him to give his opinion as to
((what will be the condition within the next :five or ten
years for demand of that kind of material." The witness
replied as follows: uwe (whoever that is) are using more
concretes every year, by the national surveys, and I think
this type of material will be in greater demand as years
go by." (Tr. 94 and 95) Then the witness covered the
subject of future ((industrial expansion." He testified:
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uwell, I feel

that there will be a considerable demand for
fill material, an increased demand as we grow in this area."
The witness was also permitted to give his opinion as to
how the present consumption of fill material compares
with uwhat was consumed in this valley 25 years ago."
(Tr. 96.) The court also allowed Mr. Ford to testify
concerning a 1954 purchase from the State of Idaho of
certain materials by his company near Soda Springs, Idaho.
(Tr. 9 8) Such a sale is so remote in time and place as to
be irrelevant. That bit of incompetent information admittedly formed the basis for this witness' speculative
opinion of the value of respondents' material. (Tr. 109)
On cross examination, Mr. Ford testified that he did
not know whether there was a willing buyer for respondents' Promontory Point material; that he did not know of
anyone who would p·ay more than 2110th of 1¢ per cubic
yard for the material he examined at Promontory on behalf
of respondents; that he knew of no person who wanted
to buy the material at any price when the law suits were
commenced nor at the present time; and that his valuation
of the Promontory Point material of 5¢ per cubic yard
was arrived at solely from the price paid in the above Idaho
sale to his company. (Tr. 109)
PRESENTATION OF AUTHORITIES
The court below, by admitting into evidence the
respondents' Exhibit 2 showing other so-called sales of fill
material, and by permitting the witnesses, Storey, Gibbons
and Ford to give their opinions of the value of the material, committed reversible error. The trial court also was
guilty of prejudicial error in allowing respondents' wit-
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nesses to testify about sales of gravel material at times and
locations far removed from the taking we have in the
present law suits.
The court committed reversible error in refusing to
give appellant's requested instruction No. 3 limiting the
jury to a finding of value for the material of not more than
two tenths (2/10) of a cent per cubic yard, that being
the figure established by the only competent evidence of
value in the record, the sale by Mr. Adams to appellant.
(Tr. 341, Exhibit 8)
Finally, because of the incompetent testimony permitted of respondents' witnesses respecting speculative
and future values, uses and markets for respondents' fill
material, and because the respondents failed to sustain their
burden of proving the damages they sustained by appellant's condemnation, the court fatally erred in refusing
to grant appellant's motion for a new trial.
Appellant submits the following authorities to support its position upon the above points:
This court in State of Utah vs. Peek, 265 Pac. 2d 630,
1 Utah 2d 263, ruled directly upon the subject of similar
sales as evidence of value. The court held admissible the
testimony o£ the owners' witnesses concerning sales of
land located between the lots under condemnation for the
uThis is the Place Monument" site in Salt Lake City. The
lower court had rejected that testimony as well as evidence
of the price paid in a urecent sales of a neighboring subdivision." In holding that the lower court erred in rejecting this evidence, the court discussed W ig1nore on
Evidence, 3rd Edition, and Nichols on Eminent Domain,
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Vol. 5, and quoted from Nichols, page 269 to 277, as
follows:
u tU pon the question whether the price paid
a·t voluntary sales of land similar to that taken at
or about the time of the taking is admissible as
independent evidence of the value of the land taken
there is conflict of authority. It is held in most
jurisdictions that such evidence is admissible.' "
The Utah court then announced the following rule:
uThus the price paid for similar lands, if the
time of such sale and location of the lands are sufficiently near and the sale is made without compulsion, is admissible in evidence on direct examination
to show the value of the lands in question. However, to be admissible there must be a similarity
between the two properties, even though they do
not have to be identical in size or shape or possible
uses, but there must be sufficient similarity in these
respects and in proximity in time of sale and the
location of the properties to satisfy the trial judge
that such evidence will be helpful to the jury in
determining the value of the property in question.

"
Appellant submits that the uother sales" testified to
by Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Ford and the information contained in Mr. Gibbons' survey list admitted into evidence
as defendants' Exhibit 2, violate the above standards established by this court in the Peek case because, as we have
above pointed out, two of the Exhibit's references to price
do not even refer to a sale; and furthermore, there was no
similarity shown in location, time or circumstances between the Exhibit's sales and the acquisition of respondents' materials.
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The authorities on condemnation agree that value to
the taker is no basis for an award of damages and should
be excluded from consideration in a condemnation case.
See Volume 3, Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 8.61;
also Orgel, Volume 1, Page 352, (often cited by the Utah
Supreme Court) where decisions of the United States
Supreme Court are cited in support of the author's statement that exclusion of value to the taker is the ((uniform
law of the land." In our situation, the testimony of defendants' witnesses amounts to proof not of market value,
but what a taker should or would pay if and when he needs
the gravel for some job. For instance, Mr. Gibbons testified that the defendants' gravel material would be worth
S¢ per yard to him if he had uthe contract" for the project.
Mr. Ford stated that such fill material had a value of 5¢
because his contracting company had found it expedient
to pay that price in Idaho for a use not shown to be probable in the foreseeable future for any fill material on
Promontory Point, let alone respondents' material. He
was speaking of a value to a future taker, not a market
value, which he denied existed.
In the condemnation suit of State vs. Noble, 6 Utah
2d 40, 305 Pac. 2d 495, involving gravel lands, this court
quoted from the Utah decision of State vs. Tedesco, 4 U tab
2d 248, 291 Pac. 2d 102 8, some language that well shows
the irrelevant and incompetent nature of the above outlined testimony of respondents' witnesses, as follows:

(('"A condemnee is not entitled to realize a
profit on his property. It must go to the condemnor for its fair market value. . . . The test is not
what the lots will bring when and if willing buyers
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come along, but what the tract, as a unit, as is,
platted or not, and in whatever state of completion,
will bring from a willing buyer of the whole
tract.' "
The Tedesco .case declares this pertinent rule:
uA speculator or investor, in deciding what
price he could afford to pay, would consider the
chances and probabilities of the situation as then
actually existing. A jury should do the same thing.
They are not to inquire what a speculator might be
able to realize out of a resale in the future, but
what a present purchaser would be willing to pay
for it in the condition it is now in."
The Noble decision goes on to say:
uThe measure of damages is (said to be) the
market value of the property and not the output
thereof. The accepted formula for determining
fair market value is not how much would the property produce over a period of fifteen years, but
what would a purchaser willing to buy but not
required to do so pay and what would a seller willing to sell but not required to do so, pay."
The testimony of all the respondents' witnesses relative to valuation of the fill material fails to conform with
these rules of our highest state court.

Volume 1 of Orgel on Eminent Domain, page 154, in
discussing fair market value and speculative uses, states:
((The courts draw the line at the point where
it can be said that a purchaser would actually buy
the property for the use in question. An appraiser
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must be prepared to show that the uses which he
considered could actually command a price in the
market. The courts have variously stated that such
uses must be immediately available within a
reasonable time."
The author quotes from the Pennsylvania case of
A. D. Grah~ttm f5 Co. vs. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm.,
33 Atl. 2d 22, where the court announced the rule that
((evidence of the value of land for a particular purpose
is of no avail when there is shown no market for land for
such a purpose. For example, a certain kind of timber
might be useful in the making of bows and arrows but if
there was no market for these implements, the timber's
value for su.ch use could not be shown." The analogy to
respondents' evidence of value is striking.
Again, in Volume 1 of Orgel, page 15 8, is a quotation
from a recent case, State Highway Commission vs. Brown,
168 So. 277, in support of the author's statement that
uthe mere existence of the physical facilities to make the
use available does not prove that the use may be considered
as influencing market value." That decision involved the
taking for a highway of a strip of land used principally
for farming. The owner contended that the property was
available for industrial uses, and the jury evidently accepted that conclusion and awarded some $9,000.00 damages. The appellate court set aside the verdict with these
words:
uwe are reminded by appellee (owner) of the
fact that the jury views this land insofar as adaptability for industrial sites is concerned. These jurors
might have gone the length and breadth of any
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railroad in this state and found lands that were
perfectly beautiful and perfectly adapted to manufacturing enterprises, but that fact alone would not
authorize the assumption that such land would be
sought and used for such purposes within any reasonable time .... After showing that the property
is adapted to a particular use and available therefor,
it must appear that there is some probability that
the land will be used for such purpose within a
reasonable time. The fact that a manufacturing
plant might be established upon the land within
twenty years would add but little intrinsic present,
determinate, market value to the land, whereas the
probability that such a plant might be established
thereon within a year or two would add materially
to the present market value thereof and would be
a basis upon which a verdict could be rendered."
In our situation, the testimony of defendants' witnesses on gravel values, and particularly that of Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Ford, amounts to no more than a forecast
that defendants' fill material may at some future time
have a value for some use such as a highway, at some indefinite place. Defendants have not met their burden of
proving any legal damage or value for the gravel taken.
In considering the above decisions, we must keep in
mind that the willing buyer or prospective user, or the
demand or purpose for the property, as discussed by the
courts, does not refer to or mean the condemnor. In all
condemnations there is always such a party-an unwilling
buyer who :finds it necessary to buy the property to fulfill
a public need and service of some kind.
We have already noted the objectionable statement
in plaintiff's Exhibit 2 relative to an offer by a third party
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(Geneva Steel) to sell some three million cubic yards of
fill at a certain price. The particular ((NOTE" in that
Exhibit does not even state the year or place said offer
was made. An outstanding author on condemnation, Orgel
on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Volume 1, at pages
620-622, discusses the error in admitting such evidence or
testimony. Orgel points out that such evidence constitutes an attempt to get before the jury hearsay declarations
of third parties as to value not supported by oath, without
the right of cross-examination by the appellant. In support thereof he cites a number of decisions, including the
Montana case of Helena Power Transmission Co. vs. McLean, 99 Pac. 1061. There, in a condemnation suit, the
lower court had allowed the jury to consider uwhat similar
land has actually been offered for sale.... " The Montana
Supreme Court, in ruling that such evidence was inadmissible, stated:
uWhat land has been offered for by one not a
party to the suit is not a criterion of the market
value, and the evidence of such offer is inadmissible
for the very obvious reason that the offer is not
made by one under oath and subject to crossexamination. An offer to sell stands upon precisely
the same footing as an offer to purchase, and evidence of either is objectionable upon the ground
stated."
The court quoted from another Montana case, Yellowstone Park R. R. Co. vs. Bridger Coal Co., 87 Pac. 963
as follows:
u (Furthermore, the value of such evidence
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lateral issues that it cannot be relied on with safety.
The reception of this .class of evidence would multiply the issues upon questions of damages to an
extent not to be tolerated by courts aiming to
practically administer justice between litigants.'"

Orgel, supra, page 622 comments:
uWith reference to offers by owners to sell
property not taken, the courts have held that this
proof is not admissible both by direct examination
and cross-examination."
Attention is called to the decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Atlantic ·Coast Line R. ·Co. et al vs.
United States, 132 Fed. 2d 959, wherein the court, in a
condemnation proceeding by the Government ruled that
offers which had been made to owners of land are not
admissible to prove value and that an opinion of an expert
founded in part on such evidence uought not to be expressed." The court also ruled that an actual sale remote
in time affords no standard of value.
The above authorities and comments apply equally
well to the second uNOTE" on Exhibit 2, which, as we
have heretofore observed, pertains to a bookkeeping valuation or charge made by Gibbons & Reed Company for
its fill material. The time and the locality of the job or
jobs to which that c:c:NOTE" might refer are not even
indicated. Appellant submits that the admission of such
evidence of itself constitutes reversible error.

~!
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY
THE QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND
BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN
TESTIMONY PERTAINING THERETO.
(a) THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRODUCE COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT OTHER SIMILAR LANDS WERE UNAVAILABLE.
The Utah statute giving a right to severance damages under certain conditions is Section 78-34-10(2),
U.C.A. 1953, as follows:
((Compensation and damages-How assessed
-the court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain
and assess:

*

*

*

(2) If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.
cc (3)
If the property, though no part thereof
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of
the proposed improvement, the amount of such
damages."
u

While the above Section 3 does not refer to useverance" damage, we quote it for the court's information and
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because much of the following discussion upon useverance"
damage applies equally to that part of the statute.
In considering the question or issue of useverance"
damage, we must keep in mind that the 40 acre tract taken
for gravel in the Chournos case was at the time of suit
isolated from his other grazing lands on Promontory by
property of others. Instead of being contiguous to his
immense holdings of some 20,000 acres on Promontory,
that tract was separated therefrom by distances up to six
miles (Defendants' Exhibit 1) . Furthermore, the Promontory lands of Hunter-Arthur at the time of the commencement of suit were on a checkerboard pattern, some
parcels not even contiguous. Their two areas taken by
plaintiff under its right to condemn were located, with
the exception of two small isolated tracts of HunterArthur lands totaling 240 acres, at the extreme southern
end of the 14,000 acres they owned on Promontory Point
at the time of suit. The total pit area upon the HunterArthur properties amounts to approximately 36 acres
(Appellant's Exhibit 4 and Tr. 204). Little Valley, where
the said gravel pits making up borrow pit #2 are located,
runs easterly across part of Promontory from the Lake
shore, and extends through sections 2 and 1, Township 6
North, Range 6 West, and into sections 6, S and 4 of
Township 6 North, Range 5 West, in that order (Defendants' Exhibit 1) . Respondents claim that the gravel pit
dug by appellant for the necessary fill material has interfered with and otherwise damaged their sheep operations
over and upon their respective Promontory lands and in
and through Little Valley, so as to cause them useverance"
damage. Mr. Chournos also asked for and was awarded
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such damages in the sum of $3,200 for the one year appellant conducted its gravel operations on his 40 acres in
Little Valley. The jury awarded respondents Chournos
and his wife $32,000.00 for their claimed useverance"
damage, and also awarded respondents Hunter-Arthur
$32,000.00 for their claimed useverance" injury. (See the
special verdict in each case and Tr. 361, 362 where an
error of arithmetic occurs at line 13 for the temporary
damage amount awarded Mr. Chournos) .
The land ownership of Little Valley and the other
Promontory lands with which the suits are concerned is
indicated in color on said Exhibit 1. Please observe how
extensive are the lands of Mr. Adams and the Federal
Government in Little Valley. All of the Hunter-Arthur
lands on Promontory were under lease to Mr. Adams for
his sheep operations during the five years just prior to the
trial. ( T r. 191 , 2 52 )
Point II of this brief is directed to this item of damages awarded respondents, namely ((severance" damage.
In attempting to prove such loss, the respondents omitted
an indispensable element of proof. They failed to prove
that no land comparable to that taken by appellant was
available for them to purchase. Mr. Chournos, testifying
for Mrs. Hunter and Mrs. Arthur as well as for himself,
talked of the importance in the whole sheep operations of
all Little Valley and the total pit area (including part of
Delbert Adams' land and Government lands). (Tr. 154)
Chournos testified that Little Valley is c:c:the best place
we got to go" to run the sheep east and west, c:c:we" meaning
((anybody." (Tr. 160-161) At all times he emphatically
stated that he was talking of the pit from one end to
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the other. (Tr. 155, 187-188) But neither Mr. Chournos
nor Hunter-Arthur established at the trial that they were
unable to obtain lands in the nearby vicinity similar to
their small tracts used for appellant's fill material. On
the contrary, Chournos testified that about a year before
the present suit he had purchased some Hunter land situated on Promontory about two to three miles north of
Little Valley. ( T r. 18 8 -18 9) His witness, Mr. Keller,
testified that other lands, including Hunter-Arthur property, immediately adjoining Little Valley on the north
were comparable to Little Valley. (Tr. 236)
The decisions of this court point out the necessity of
proof that similar lands were unavailable. In the case of
Provo River Water User's Ass'n. vs. Carlson, et al, 13 3 Pac.
2d 777, 103 Utah 93, the Association condemned some 18
acres of pasture land as part of the Deer Creek Reclamation Project, and the defendant owner claimed severance
damage to some properties a mile and a half from the
condemned land. The defendant's theory was that a
uunity of use" existed between the pasture land and the
dairy project on the remaining lands, and that the taking
of the pasture depreciated his remaining lands. He contended that all of his lands must be treated as Hone large
parcel"; that his lands used for the dairy operation were
more valuable as a dairy unit when used with the pasture
condemned than if used without it. The Supreme Court,
in reversing the damage award, held that the lower court
erred in submitting to the jury the so-called severance
damage, for a number of reasons. The court stated that
all of the Utah decisions have c:c:predicated both severance
damages and damages to lands not taken, on some physical
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injury to lands not condemned, such as lowering or raising
the level of a street . . . or restriction of the remaining
area in size or shape, so as to render it less valuable for
purposes to which it was formerly adapted. . . ." Then
the court stated that it was not necessary to decide, under
the facts of the case, whether the lands must be contiguous
or must be physically impaired by the project to allow
severance damages, but based its decision chiefly upon the
defendant owner's failure to show that the pasture taken
was not uthe only pasture land available within a mile
and a half of the remaining property." Even if no similar
uncultivated pasture land were available, defendant would
not be entitled, said the court, to severance damages if
there are other farm lands available for purchase which
would produce relatively the same results. uEven some of
defendant's own farm lands could be cultivated into pasture." If defendant could purchase other pasture land
or other land convertible into pasture uwithin a distance
from his remaining land, comparable to that of the condemned tract, and such other land would provide relatively
the same kind of forage . . . it could not be contended
that his other properties could be impaired or depreciated
by taking the pasture."
Another Utah decision, State vs. Cooperative Security
Corporation of L. D. S. Church, 247 Pac. 2jd 269,
122 Utah 134, involved a condemnation of about 8 acres
of defendant's farm land comprising 131 acres. The court
ruled that severance damages based on the theory that
the defendant's farm was a unit operation, could not be
awarded. Defendant must first establish proof uthat no
comparable land is available in the area of the condemned
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land." This it failed to do. The Supreme Court cited the
above Provo River Association case in support of its
decision.
The above objection herein being made to the socalled severance damage applies equally to respondents'
proof of the amount of such damage supposedly suffered.
Mr. Chournos related that the lands remaining to respondents after all the fill material was removed were thereby
made 20% less valuable. He gave a figure of $1400.00 as
the annual loss of value to his remaining land and the
Hunter-Arthur lands. He determined his :figure from
rentals Hunter-Arthur received under a :five year lease of
their Promontory lands to Delbert Adams. (Tr. 170-171,
184-185, 191) Then Mr. Keller, another witness for respondents, testified about the amount of the ccseverance"
damage from the whole pit area, and tied it to the same
rentals received from Mr. Adams. (Tr. 229 and 232) One
fatal defect in their testimony is that those two witnesses
assumed there was no similar land available to the respective respondents. The above cited case of The Provo River
Water User's Association, supra, ruled directly upon that
point. In that decision the Utah Supreme Court found
reversible error in the lower court's admission of testimony
that defendant's remaining lands had a greater market
value as a farming unit by using the condemned pasture
than without such pasture. uThere were several fatal objections to such opinion testimony. First, the opinion
testimony was based on the premise not established by evidence, that there were no other pasture lands available
within the same distance and no farm land which could
be converted into pasture to provide the necessary forage
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for cattle during the summer. Second, if another tract
of equal value and productivity as a pasture were obtained
to replace the pasture taken by plain tiff, the combined
value of all of (defendant's) properties when used in connection with a pasture, would be wholly immaterial and
irrelevant."
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POINT II
(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM APPELLANT'S OPERATIONS UPON LANDS NOT
OWNED BY RESPONDENTS.
As this brief has already indicated, the only ((severance" damage which respondents attempted to establish
at the trial was expressly related to the whole pit area
#2, situated mostly upon Mr. Adams' land, and some
lesser amount upon United States lands. (See the maps,
Exhibit #1 and appellees' Exhibit #4) Mr. Chournos'
testimony conclusively shows he used such a basis for his
opinion of both his and the Hunter-Arthur damages. He
stated that he had uto consider the whole thing (pit)" and
did not know the severance damage resulting to respondents from the excavations on their respective lands. (Tr.
192-193). He referred to Little Valley and the whole
pit area as his and the other respondents' own lands for
the sheep operations. In testifying about the alleged damages to their sheep business, he emphasized that he was
speaking of uall the pit from one end to the other." (Tr.
154-15 5) Mr. Chournos talked of the ((forage damage,"
((hazards" and the ((interference" to the sheep from the
whole pit in Little Valley. (Tr. 155-156, 164-165, 171,
178) Mr. Keller, respondents' other witness on ((severance" damage, likewise referred only to the big pit area.
(Tr. 227, 230, 23 3) In fact, he evidently was referring
to the period of time when he held and used much of the
Chournos, Hunter and Adams lands, including Little
Valley. (Tr. 202) Respondents ignored the fact that the
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excavations and the resulting difficulties of which they
complained occurred chiefly upon someone else's land and
to someone else-. (Tr. 18 8) Respondents thereby are seeking payment for damages belonging, if at all, to others.
It is significant in this regard that Mr. Chournos admitted
Mr. Adams, and not Chournos, rightly had used Little
Valley and the big pit area for his sheep operations during
the last five years, including about a year since the pit
was there. (Tr. 198-199) Furthermore, no evidence was
presented that any respondent had the slightest right to
go·upon Mr. Adams' lands in Little Valley.
The courts of our land have established that the owners are not entitled to damages from the condemnor's use
of a third party's lands and that it is reversible error to
permit the same, or testimony thereof. A leading case
frequently cited by the courts is the United States Supreme
Court decision of Campbell vs. United States, 69 L. Ed.
328; 266 U. S. 368. There, the Government had taken
approximately 2 acres of the owner's land out of some 69
acres he held, and the entire tract taken by the Government comprised 1300 acres. The United States constructed
upon the lands of plaintiff and the other owners Hroads,
railroads, buildings, a sewerage system and such other
things as are incidental to a large industrial plant." The
Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling which
denied the owner the right to compensation for the use
made of the adjoining owner's land, with these words:
.:.:Plaintiff (owner) had no right to prevent
the taking and use of the lands of others . . . if
the land taken from plaintiff had belonged to another, or if it had not been deemed part and parcel
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of his estate, he would not have been entitled to
anything on account of the diminution of his
estate .... "
The court observed that the damages resulting to
the remainder of plaintiff's lands were separable from
those caused by the use made of the lands acquired from
the other owners. uThe liability of the United States is
not greater than would be that of private users (carrying
on the same activities of the condemnor) ."
At 170 A. L. R.;Page 721, is an annotation on this
point, and it is there stated that the general rule denies
the owner compensation for the reduced value of the
remainder of his land caused by the acquisition and use
of ad joining lands of others for the same project. There
follows a list of citations from the courts of California,
Colorado, Idaho, and Massachusetts.
An Idaho decision, 0. W. R. f5 N. Co., vs. Campbell,
202 Pac. 1065, involved a condemnation for the construction of a railroad. The owner complained that the railroad
operations on another's land taken caused water to run
through defendant's land and polluted his fresh water
stream on the remainder of his land. The statute, like the
law of Utah, provided for compensation for damages to
property not actually taken, but injuriously affected. The
court denied recovery, ruling that the owner could not
be awarded damages caused by construction of the railroad on lands outside of defendant's lands.

n·

A Colorado case in point is Keller vs. Miller, 165 Pac.
774, wherein the condemnation was for a right-of-way to
construct a drainage ditch upon defendant's land. The

I

~
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state statute allowed damages to the owner as a result of
the condemnation of lands, taken, or injuriously affected,
though not taken. The court denied the defendant any
compensation for injury to the remainder of her lands
from construction and use of the ditches on the lands of
others. The decision quotes from Lewis, Eminent Domain,
Section 569: cDamages to the remainder by what is done
elsewhere than on the part taken are not to be considered.'"
Ct

In Public Service Co. vs. Loveland, 245 Pac. 493, the
Colorado court refused to allow damages allegedly suffered
to the owner's remaining land by the electric power plant's
activities on lands belonging to others. The opinion cited
the Keller case supra, and observed that cc:there must be
a limitation upon the extent of the damages recoverable."
In the California case of Department of Public Works
vs. Emerson, 57 Pac. 2d 955, the condemnation was for a
right-of-way to construct a highway over part of defendant's lands. The owner claimed severance damage for
failure to provide a cattle crossing for access to water
available through a former crossing under the old highway.
Neither the old crossing nor the water supply was on the
property of the defendant owner. The court observed
that the rule established in California is that the owner
cannot recover damages suffered as a result of the railroad's operations and obstructions on another owner's
property. The court quoted from the above cited case
of Keller vs. Miller as follows: ccThe detriment for which
the owner may recover compensation is that which will
result from the operation of the works upon his land
alone."
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POINT II
(c) THE SO-CALLED ((SEVERANCE" DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES CONSISTED OF DAMAGES SUPPOSED
TO HAVE RESULTED TO A BUSINESS CARRIED ON BY RESPONDENTS, OR THEIR
LESSEE, NAMELY SHEEP OPERATIONS.
Much of respondents' evidence of ((severance" damage is actually attempted proof of interference with the
sheep business. Even a cursory reading of Chournos' testimony shows that fact. (Tr. 154-188) The witness and
his counsel frequently refer to usheep operations" and loss
to such operations from the gravel pit in Little Valley.
Let us give an example or two from the Chournos testimony given upon direct examination. Mr. Chournos,
referring to all of the lands he owned, including the 20,000
acres on Promontory Point, testified as follows:

ceQ. Now, Mr. Chournos, all of these lands you
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

have mentioned and roughly described, are
they used in the one sheep operation?
Yes.
To round out a year-long operation, all of
these lands are used by you?
Yes.
Are they all necessarily used by you? Is it
necessary to have all of them in order to carry
on your operation?
Yes.
Do these Promontory lands fit into and form
a part of that over-all year-long sheep operation?
Yes." (Tr. 142)
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uQ. All right now, Mr. Chournos, I asked you
what importance, if any, the Little Valley area
plays in your lambing operation.
A. Well, Little Valley is one of the key valleys
in that whole area. It's better for feed and it's
not too steep." (Tr. 154)
uQ. But I want you to tell us everything you can
about how Little Valley has been used in your
lambing operations. Are you through telling
us that?
A. Well, it's been used-·In the ·fall of the year
we use the east side, and then certain time
later on we'll go over the top, down into Little
Valley and down to the shore, the mouth of
Little Valley. It's pretty valuable, and the
way it is now, you take that pit, that's around
two miles long. You take a bunch of ewes and
lambs-" (Tr. 155)
Speaking of his alleged damages, Mr. Chournos stated:

uQ. Mr. Chournos, you have described your own
lands and the way you operate your own sheep.
I now ask you what damage, if any, has been
done your own operations by the removal of
this gravel from the area in Little Valley.
A. It will affect me in the same way." (Tr. 174)
The trial court itself, in addressing defendants' counsel and the jury at the beginning of Mr. Chournos' testimony, referred to respondents' sheep business in the
following language:
THE COURT: uwell, but you'll have to
prove they're in the sheep operation business. Let's
take one at a time. I may ask you a question about
severance damages, gentlemen, if these people can
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establish that their operation has been interfered
with. Now there's a whole lot of ramifications to
that, but just to introduce the subject to you now,
it looks like we're going over on that question of
severance damage." ( T r. 151 )
Injury or loss to business is not a proper element of
condemnation damage, whether by useverance" or otherwise. This court and a large rna jori ty of other jurisdictions have disallowed such an element. In State vs. Noble,
6 Utah 2d 40; 305 Pac. 2d 495, a suit for condemnation
of property, including sand and gravel, the court rejected
proof of the productivity of the fill material from the
property and stated:
uThe measure of damage is (said to be) the
market value of the property. and not the output
thereof. The accepted formula for determining
fair market value is not how much would the property produce over a period of fifteen years, but
what would a purchaser willing to buy but not
required to do so, pay and what would a seller
willing to sell but not required to do so, ask."
Quoting from a California case, City of Los Angeles
vs. Dea.con, 7 Pac. 378, the Supreme Court commented:
uEvidence of realized profits derived from
(the business) receives the same treatment as general business profits, and similar reasons are advanced for the exclusion of the testimony."

A case cited by Nichols is Oakland vs. Pacific Coast
Lumber a.nd Mill Company, 153 Pac. 705, wherein the city
brought eminent domain proceedings for some shore land
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containing docks and the owner's lumber yard. The owner's lumber mill, equipment and operations were mainly
upon its property some 400 feet from the condemned
area. The owner insisted that the taking of the one parcel
interfered with its complete mill business and that all of
its property was operated as a unit, even though not contiguous. It also contended that under the laws of California it was entitled to recover damages for the uproved
injury to its mill business." The state statute provided at
that time that the owner was entitled to damages for the
property taken and also damages uwhich will accrue to
the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion condemned." The California
Supreme Court held that the statute did not permit recovery for injury or loss to the lumber business. Here
the owner claimed that the taking of the wharf property
had adversely affected its whole lumber operation by
making more difficult the handling of lumber. The
opinion stated:
uit is quite within the power of the Legislature
to declare that a damage to that form of property
known as business or the good will of a business
shall be compensated for; but, unless the Constitution or the Legislature has so declared, it is the
universal rule of construction that an injury or
inconvenience to a business is damnum absque injuria and does not form an element of the compensating damages to be awarded."
As in this California case, the Utah statute makes no
provision for damage to a business, and that it is in reality
what respondents claim when they speak of their sheep
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operations and the adverse affect of the gravel pit upon
that business.
In the United States Supreme Court case of Bothwell
vs. United States, 254 U. S. 231, 65 L. Ed. 23 8, the ·Federal Government condemned a large tract of land in
Wyoming, upon which was conducted a stock raising
business. Prior to the condemnation for the Pathfinder
Dam the owner had run more than 1000 head of cattle
upon the property. The owner had already obtained compensation for the value of the land flooded by the dam
waters. In the subject proceeding before the United States
Court of Claims, the owner asked for a loss suffered upon
a forced sale of the cattle and destruction of his cattle
business resulting from the Government's condemnation.
The Supreme Court ruled that the owner could not
recover such loss of the business. The court stated:
((Appellant's position in respect of the items
in question is no better than it would have been if
no condemnation proceedings had been instituted.
. . . There was no a.ctual taking of these things by
the United States, and consequently no basis for
an implied promise to make compensation."
The court cited the case of Mitchell vs. United States,
267 U. S. 341, 69 L. Ed. 644, wherein the Government
condemned certain lands used for the growing of corn.
The owners were unable, as a result of the taking, to reestablish themselves in the former business of growing the
special type of corn. The Federal Statute provided for just
compensation as determined by the President, and gave
the owner the right to bring suit for whatever additional
payment he felt he should receive. The owners sued to
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obtain damages for loss of the business. The Court held
that the owners could not get such compensation under
the act or under the United States Constitution. The
opinion stated:
uThe settled rules of law, however, precluded
(the President's) considering in that determination
consequential damages for losses to their business,
or for its destruction. . . . There is no finding as
a fact that the government took the business, or
that what it did was intended as a taking. If the
business was destroyed, the destruction was an
unintended incident of the taking of land."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in U. S. vs.
Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F2 172, passed upon a situation quite analagous to ours. The Government condemned some land used by defendant, along with other
lands, for the raising of sugar cane. The Company had
a working agreement for that purpose with the owners
of the land condemned. The plantation (Company)
claimed useverance" damages because of the uloss of value
of its properties as an operating concern, resulting in an
over capacity of the sugar mill and refinery." The appellate court, in reversing the trial court upon this item of
damage, stated:
uSince Plantation had no property interest in
the lands condemned, this claim is for business
losses. Since the right to recover such losses does
not exist by law ... the contracting parties could
not create by agreement between themselves such
a right valid against the United States. . .. By
adulteration, the experts for Plantation evolved a
clever amalgam of two proper doctrines as a basis
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for compensation. It is a rule that, in condemnation of part of a tract owned in fee simple, just
compensation is the market value of the tract as
a whole, before condemnation, less the market
value of the portion which remains after the taking
of the part. The rule applies exclusively to condemnation of fee simple title of a tract in one
ownership. It is a rule that, if market value cannot be established by sales of comparable property,
consideration of other factors may be necessary
to establish just compensation. But it must not be
forgotten that the market value of real property
is the criterion ,and losses to a business are not for
·Consideration. . . . Where part of a tract in fee
ownership is condemned, the loss in market value
of the remainder cannot be augmented by consideration of the damage caused thereto by the taking
or prospective use of lands held by third parties
in fee simple as part of the same project. Nor can
the fact that an enterprise upon one parcel depends
upon other lands in fee ownership of third parties
for supply of an essential material be used to connect the two for purposes of compensation."
Discussing the question of injury to a business, Nichols, Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 4, Section
13.3 at page 255 states:
uThe case is no different when the business is
destroyed by taking the land on which it is conducted. It is well settled that when land occupied
for business purposes is taken by eminent domain
(the owner) or occupant is not entitled to recover
compensation for the destruction of his business
or the injury thereto by its necessary removal from
its established location."
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In Volume 4, Section 13.3 ( 1), the same authority
says:
uThe general rule in this country is that such
business and the fruits thereof are too uncertain,
remote and speculative to be used as the criterion
of the market value of the land upon which
business is conducted."

POINT II
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE ARRIVED AT BY ADDING THE VALUES OF DIFFERENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN.
The special verdicts in cases #8071 and #8191
awarded respondents compensation for the gravel taken
from their lands in Little Valley. Those verdicts also
contain an award of compensation for an item loosely
referred to by the lower court and respondents as ((severance damage." Under that name, the court permitted
respondents to recover damages claimed for loss of the
pit area as a pasture or ((forage" land, a lambing ground,
a pathway for sheep to and from water and to other
p·asture areas belonging to somebody. (Tr. 147, 152-164,
171) Thus respondents were allowed to show a use or
value of the lands for :fill material and, over appellant's
objection, an inconsistent use or value for the sheep business. Furthermore, the court admitted testimony of
respondents which purported to show an actual severance
damage to the remaining lands of each respondent supposedly resulting from the gravel pits. (Tr. 177, 183, 233)
In addition, the court, over objection, received evidence
that the gravel pit constituted a nuisance and thereby
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damaged respondents. For instance, respondents' counsel
and witness Chournos talked of the resulting uhazards,"
udeath trap" to sheep, the steepness of the pit banks, cost
of leveling them, etc. (Tr. 164-167, 178) (Such testimony has nothing to do with severance damage and has
no proper place in these condemnation suits) .
Aside from the fact that all of the above outlined
testimony referred to the whole pit situated mostly on
third parties lands, prejudicial error in that testimony is
that it permitted respondents to show and recover for
inconsistent uses of their property taken, namely, as a
gravel pit and as sheep land. The fact that respondents
did not place a separate monetary value upon the lands
used by appellant and upon various items of sheep land
damage claimed, but lumped them into one general sum
called useverance damage," does not alter the picture. The
lower court itself during the trial recognized the principle
involved but did not follow its early admonition to Mr.
Oman that respondents would have to elect as to their
damages. (Tr. 168, 171) If such proof of all these uses
is to be permitted, appellant here will be required to pay
more than once for the same land, and the meaning and
intent of the Utah laws of just compensation will be
defeated.
The court decisions of this country have decried such
a result.
In Volume 29, Corpus Juris Secundu.m, page 1025,
appears this statement in the annotation:
ulf land is valuable for two purposes and use
for one excludes use for other, only value for one
use may be recovered,"
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ctttng Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co. v.
Monongahela Development Co., (W. Va.) 132 S.E. 380.
In that decision the owner was permitted in the lower
court to introduce evidence of the value of the land taken,
both as a unit and as divided into lots. The court stated:
uRecovery is sought by the owner on both a
lot and a section basis. This cannot be allowed ....
Of course, this rule would not apply where land
was valuable for two purposes and its use for one
purpose would not interfere with the use for the
other."
The court cited the Montana case of Railway Company vs. Warren, 12 Pac. 641. There, the condemnation
was for a railroad right-of-way and the land taken covered defendant owner's mining claim for which he asked
compensation. The owner was permitted at the trial to
prove also that the land had a value for town lots. The
court's instruction was that the defendant could not recover for the value of the land both as a mining claim and
for town lots. The Montana Supreme Court approved
this instruction, stating that ((we cannot presume the
jury disregarded the instruction, for it does not so appear
from the testimony."
The decisions and authorities usually state that the
owner is entitled to show all available uses and can recover
for the uhighest use"; but they uniformly hold that the
owner cannot show a separate value or damage for each
use and add the total as a basis of recovery. For example,
he cannot have the value of the land as a gravel pit, and
also a value or damage for another use. Nichols, Eminent
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Domain, Third Edition, Volume 4, page 105. As stated
in the decision of Morton Butler Timber Co. vs. the United
States, 91 F 2nd 884, the owner cannot uprove separately
the values of various uses to which the land is adapted,
and then add the separate items of value to obtain the
compensable value of the land taken by eminent domain."
That case involved land containing timber, and the owners
attempted to prove separately the stumpage value of the
timber. The court rejected such proof. That decision
approves a Tennessee case, Alloway vs. Nashville, 13 S. W.
12 3, in the following words:
uThe court declined to permit all the capabilities of the property to be priced separately and
the aggregate to be calculated as the true value·,
for they do not exist independently of each other~
and cannot all be realized at the same time."
Also, Volume 1, Orgel On Valuation, page 151, states
that uproperty has but one market value, not one for one
use and another for another use."
The Utah Supreme Court in Moyle vs. Salt Lake City,
176 P. 2d 882, 111 Utah 201, has recognized the rule of
recovery for the highest and best use in a case involving
water condemnation.
In our situation, the damage, if any, to sheep operations results from respondents' alleged loss of use of the
gravel pit area for grazing and other sheep uses. In other
words, they claim that the areas taken were worth so much
to each respondent as sheep land and as part of the whole
grazing unit; that by taking the fill material, appellant
has destroyed that use of the particular area.
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Appellant submits that recovery in this case for either
permanent or temporary damage to lands not taken or to
the sheep operations, together with compensation for the
fill material, constitutes reversible error.

POINT II
RESPONDENTS PRESENTED NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE
OF THEIR REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO
HAVE BEEN DAMAGED.
(e)

The lower court committed reversible error in submitting to the jury the question of ((severance" damage
for the additional reason that no market value of the lands
of either respondent was ever established at the trial. This
is true whether the alleged damage is considered to be
under Section 78-34-10 (2) or 10 (3) of the Utah statute.
The rule is that where possible, any injury to land not
taken must be proven by showing a definite loss of the
market value resulting from the condemnation. We have
indicated that the decisions of Utah and elsewhere so hold.
See State vs. Cooperative Security Corp. of L. D. S.
Church, supra, involving farm lands, and wherein this
court declared:
uThe compensation to which an owner is entitled for severance damage . . . is the difference
in the fair market value of his property before
and after the taking."
In State vs. Noble, supra, our court ruled that the
property umust go to the condemnor for its fair market
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value." The federal case of U. S. vs. Honolulu Planta.tion,
stt pra, in declining to allow severan.ce damage in the case,
used this forceful language:
uStrict proof of the loss of market value to
the remaining parcel is obligatory."
In each useverance" case now before the court, the
only testimony relating to money damage or depreciation
of respondents' lands came from Mr. Chournos and Mr.
Keller. They based their opinions on the annual rental
Mr. Delbert Adams paid the Hunter-Arthur people for
the last five years. Each witness applied a percentage figure to that rental for a year's damage, and then multiplied
the result by an arbitrary number of years (20), to reach
a ((permanent damage" figure. (Tr. 171-175, 191, 232)
We submit that such an artificial, deceptive method has
nothing to do with market value of the respondents' lands
at any time. This court needs no authority to persuade
it of the fallacies contained in such testimony. Mr. Chournos, by use of the above method of evaluating damage,
erroneously concluded that even though the HunterArthur Promontory lands contained some 5,000 acres less
than those of Chournos, the monetary damage was the
same because the Hunter interest holds ((a little more land
close to ... the pit." (Tr. 187) Such speculation is not
at all relevant to the market value of the lands.
In some jurisdictions eviden.ce of the condemned
property's rental income under closely similar conditions
is admitted by the courts when presented by a qualified
witness as an element of a market value of that property.
We submit that is not the situation in the present cases.
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It should be noted here that the testimony of both Mr.
Chournos and Mr. Keller on the amount of severance
damages includes the areas condemned by appellant, who is
therefore being made to pay again for the gravel pit area.
No witness for respondents indicated he was acquainted with a market value for the properties, and respondents made no effort to show any market value or
even a reasonable substitute for it, such as a qualified
appraisal. That a market value existed for the lands was
made evident by respondents' own witnesses and by Mr.
Adams. Mr. Chournos in 1957 had purchased a one-half
interest in some Hunter-Arthur Promontory grazing land
just to the north of Little Valley. (Tr. 188-189) About
four years ago he exchanged some of his range lands situated to the west of Great Salt Lake for considerable range
a.creage on Promontory Point. (Tr. 214-215) Mr. Adams
placed a value of $5.00 per acre on his lands. (Tr. 332).
Mr. Keller testified that he sold his lands on Promontory
some years ago to Mr. Adams, and that he was familiar
with the lands of all the respondents. (Tr. 221) But he
was asked nothing about market value or even a value.

An amazing illustration of the prejudicial error of
the lower court in admitting certain testimony unrelated
to property values (including fill material) or any other
phase of the issues in our case is found in the crossexamination by respondents' counsel of Mr. Bagley, the
Project Engineer for appellant's whole fill construction
job at Promontory. Over appellant's objection, he was
asked and permitted to answer a question as to the ((expenditure of huge sums of money" on the whole project.
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(Tr. 303). What has that to do with the case, except to
prejudice the jury!
It is respectfully submitted that the respondents and
the court, by completely ignoring the established and fair
rules of valuation in land condemnation cases, are guilty
of reversible error.
POINT II
(f) THE TESTIMONY DO·ES NOT ESTABLISH ANY SEVERANCE OF RESPONDENTS'
LANDS AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE
COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES.
Examination of the maps (Defendants' Exhibit 1
and Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) in the cases here on appeal conclusively shows that severance of either respondents' remaining lands by the gravel pits on their respective
properties is a physical impossibility. The Hunter-Arthur
pits are on the extreme south end of their Promontory
lands, and much of their remaining lands are not adjacent
or contiguous. Chournos' 7.38 acres actually taken for the
pit excavation was already isolated from his other lands
by large tacts belonging to Mr. Adams, the Government
and the Hunter-Arthur interests.
The testimony of respondents' own witnesses is that
the pits did not prevent livestock from passing through
Little Valley, east and west as well as north. (Tr. 210, 235,
236) Mr. Adams, whose sheep had exclusive use of the
Little Valley area when the pits were made and for some
three years before, testified that his sheep had gone through
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and around the gravel pit area without serious interruption, and had lambed near the gravel pits in Little Valley.
(Tr. 256, 257, 276, 277) The pictures of the borrow
pit #2 introduced into evidence by respondents as Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 show that the pit area is passable to sheep
and contains roads through it. Mr. Keller admitted that
Chournos' sheep could go from the east side to the west
part of Promontory Point through a pass or valley just to
the north of Little Valley. (T r. 2 3 5)
The jury, the court and attorneys drove through the
length of the pit area in Little Valley the first day of trial.
(Tr. 15, 20, 21) Appellant, as stipulated at the trial, has
surrendered all possessory and other rights to all the lands
taken under the law suits here on appeal. (Tr. 150-151)
Respondents therefore have the use again of their respective lands. in that area.
What the respondents truthfully seek in their respective claims for severance damage is compensation to each
one for an alleged damage resulting from but one source,
namely, the complete pit area in Little Valley. Obviously,
that is an unjust claim.
Furthermore, the record here contains no competent
evidence that either Mr. Chournos or Hunter-Arthur
used all their Promontory lands, including the Little Valley
area taken, as a unit. As noted, Mr. Adams alone had his
sheep operations there under a herd line arrangement with
Mr. Chournos, and there is no evidence that the respondents' remaining lands suffered any physical impairment,
loss or other injury from the gravel excavations made on
their respective properties.
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Much has been written upon the nature of severance
damages, and there exists a divergence of opinion among
the courts as to what is severan.ce and what is severance
damage. See Orgel, Volume 1, supra, Chapter 4, and particularly paragraphs 53 and 54. At page 254 thereof the
author states:
ult would seem, therefore, to be unfair discrimination to reimburse a property owner for all
similar damages done to his property simply because
a portion of it, however small, may have been condemned. Bearing this point in mind, the courts
have attempted, some of them more vigorously
than others, to distinguish between damages which
a particular owner has suffered because a part of his
property has been taken, and damages which this
same owner may have suffered along with adjacent
property owners because public works, detrimental
to the remainder of his property, have been located
in the neighborhood."
Orgel pointed out that what the court should be
interested in is to prevent one award ufrom overlapping
and giving double damages."
This court, in State vs. Cooperative Security Corp.
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, supra, in
discussing the claimed severance of a pasture land from
the main farm area, referred to the rule of a unity of operation or use between the different par.cels. The case turned
upon another point, however, i.e., failure of the owner to
show the unavailability of similar land.
In another Utah decision, Provo River Water Users'
Assn. vs. Carlson, et al, supra, involving a claim for a sev-
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erance of a farm tract caused by the condemnation of
one parcel for a railroad, resulting in the flooding of some
of the land, the court commented:
uAll of the cases in this court, which we have
been able to find, have predicated both severance
damages and damages to lands not taken, on some
physical in jury to lands not condemned. . . ."
As discussed in Section II (c) of this brief, what respondents and the lower court call useverance damage" is
really a claim of interference or injury to a livestock
business, which, if it is capable of proof, is not compensable
under our law.
Appellant respectfully submits that there is no competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment for
severance damage in the cases now before this court.
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POINT III
THE VERDICTS ARE EXCESSIVE AND THE
RESULT OF PREJUDICE OF THE JURY.
In the case of State vs. Noble et al, supra, the court
stated:
uour Constitution forbids the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. To just compensation and to that only are
the defendants entitled."
The verdict in each of the cases here on appeal was
for the sum of 3¢ per cubic yard for the fill material taken,
making a total of $57,283.47 in the Hunter-Arthur suit;
$61,580.94 in the Nick Chournos suit; and $36,686.97 in
the Oman and Chournos placer claim suit. In addition,
the jury awarded Nick Chournos and wife $3,200 for the
temporary ((severance" damage for one year's occupancy
by appellant, and the sum of $32,000 as permanent ((severance" damage. In the Hunter-Arthur suit the award
was also for $32,000.00 for the alleged permanent ((severance" damage. All the awards were in answer to a form
of special verdict submitted to the jury by the court. We
submit that these verdicts constitute excessive damages
resulting from prejudice of the jury. They represent very
unjust compensation.
The lower court itself, upon the hearing of appellant's
motion for a new trial, remarked that the ((severance"
damage awarded ((shocks the conscience of the court."
(Tr. 39 3) As stated earlier in this brief, the court then
conditionally granted a new trial unless respondents remit
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one-half of the ccseverance" amounts, but appellant refused
to accept such a compromise. Appellant's opinion is that
each verdict for the fill taken is just as shocking.
One example of the jury's prejudice is the award to
Mr. Chournos of temporary useverance" damage in the
amount of $3,200. That sum is almost double any figure
given by respondents' witnesses, including Mr. Chournos
himself. Mr. Keller, with the aid of respondents' counsel,
gave the figure of $1,750, and Mr. Chournos gave a figure
of $1,400. (Tr. 171, 222)
Much of the testimony elicited from Mr. Adams upon
respondents' cross-examination, was calculated to prejudice the jury upon the fill rna terial and the useverance"
damage items. Over objection of appellant, Mr. Adams
was constrained to testify about the total amount of
money he had received and expected to receive from appellant company for his fill material, and what he was being
paid by the appellant upon a lease of some adjacent area
used for roads and certain operations related to the whole
construction job, all of which was completely irrelevant
to the only issues before the trial court, namely, the damage suffered by respondents. (Tr. 335, 336) Some of Mr.
Bagley's testimony obtained upon respondents' crossexamination, was only for the purpose of prejudicing the
jury against appellant by trying to show the immensity
and cost of the whole job and the convenience and saving
resulting to appellant from the availability of respondents'
fill material. (Tr. 303-304) Those matters likewise are
irrelevant to the issues before the court.

A large part of the questions directed to Mr. Chournos
by respondents' counsel, and his answers, were intended
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to show not ((severance" damage, but to create a resentment and deep prejudice by the jury against appellant.
Reference has heretofore been made to Chournos' testimony and Mr. Oman's questions about the hazard of the
gravel pits to the sheep operations. We call the court's
attention to other such matters contained in much of that
testimony. (Tr. 176-180)
When we measure each land owners' total award in
these cases by the small area actually used for the gravel
pit, and when we consider the nature of the uncultivated
winter grazing land involved, we can arrive at but one
logical conclusion: The jury's verdict in each case was so
excess1ve as to be the result of their prejudice against
appellant.
CONCLUSION
Our Utah Supreme Court is the final and best protection appellant has against the unjust award given to
respondents in each case now before the court. Such a
result amounts to a heavy penalty to any party called
upon, because of some public use, to exercise the right of
eminent domain.
For the reasons and upon the grounds presented in
this brief, the judgments of the lower court in the cases
here on appeal should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
W. J. O'CONNOR, JR.,

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

55
to show not useverance" damage, but to create a resentment and deep prejudice by the jury against appellant.
Reference has heretofore been made to Chournos' testimony and Mr. Oman's questions about the hazard of the
gravel pits to the sheep operations. We call the court's
attention to other such matters contained in much of that
testimony. (Tr. 176-180)
When we measure each land owners' total award in
these cases by the small area actually used for the gravel
pit, and when we consider the nature of the uncultivated
winter grazing land involved, we can arrive at but one
logical conclusion: The jury's verdict in each case was so
excessive as to be the result of their prejudice against
appellant.

CONCLUSION
Our Utah Supreme Court is the final and best protection appellant has against the unjust award given to
respondents in each ·Case now before the court. Such a
result amounts to a heavy penalty to any party called
upon, because of some public use, to exercise the right of
eminent domain.
For the reasons and upon the grounds presented in
this brief, the judgments of the lower court in the cases
here on appeal should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
W. J. O'CONNOR, JR.,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

